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THE LAW OF NARROW TAILORING
Owen Fiss
In 1954 the Supreme Court, then led by Earl Warren, declared that
segregated education constituted a denial of equal protection. In so doing,
the Court set in motion the Second Reconstruction, and, over the next two
decades, infused it with energy and vision. As part of this endeavor, the
Court affirmed sweeping decrees requiring the desegregation of public
schools and other state institutions, protected activists in the Civil Rights
Movement, and facilitated the participation of the political branches in the
process of eradicating the nation’s racial caste structure.
By the mid-1970s, and continuing for almost fifty years, the Court
changed its stance toward reconstruction. It did not openly repudiate Brown
v. Board of Education, but rather sought to limit that ruling and to deprive it of
any generative meaning. To pursue this policy, a number of Justices whose
votes were essential to the formation of a majority decided to set aside a
measure designed to eradicate caste on the ground that it was not narrowly
tailored. This occurred in cases that proved to be inflection points in the
history of the Second Reconstruction and as a result their position endowed
the law of narrow tailoring with a special prominence and significance.
One branch of the law of narrow tailoring regulates the scope of judicial
remedies. It requires that injunctions be confined to protecting against
specific and clearly defined wrongs. Another governs the interpretation and
application of the Equal Protection Clause. It requires that any law
employing a racial classification—even one that seeks to ameliorate the
position of the underclass—be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling public
purpose.
Stated in these terms, the law of narrow tailoring has a technical, largely
instrumental character—insisting on a tight relationship between means and
ends. In truth, however, on decisive occasions that occurred in the era that
began in the 1970s the narrow tailoring requirement was turned into a
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general oppositional strategy to limit the reach of Brown v. Board of Education
and the reform of American society that it decreed. As such, it was infused
with contested political or moral notions that are, as far as I can tell, not
rooted in the Constitution and that are, in any event, at odds with the
overarching purpose of the Civil War Amendments. In the end, we are left
to wonder whether the law of narrow tailoring might be reformulated in a
way that confines the narrow tailoring requirement to its original and more
salutary purpose and avoids these abuses.
THE SCOPE OF REMEDIES
In 1968 Richard Nixon, a Republican, was elected president on the basis
of a campaign that was in part based on an attack on the Warren Court and
the civil rights revolution that it sparked. During his time in the White
House, President Nixon placed four Justices on the Supreme Court—a new
Chief Justice, Warren Burger, and three Associate Justices, Harry Blackmun,
William Rehnquist, and Lewis Powell. Although Blackmun increasingly
sided with the liberal wing on Court, he began his career in a very different
way, readily lending his support to the other Nixon appointees. Sometimes
these appointees were also able to garner support from some of the holdovers
from the Warren Court.
The newly established governing coalition of the Court appeared
resolved to curb the ambitious injunctions that first appeared in the 1960s
school desegregation cases but had, by the early 1970s, been issued in a wide
variety of other cases concerning prisons, police departments, institutions for
the disabled, and public housing authorities. With this purpose in mind,
those now in power declared that all injunctions had to be tailored to fit the
violation they sought to remedy. Although the word “narrowly” was
sometimes absent from this formulation of the tailoring principle, it was in
fact implied, as all the world understood.
Like many of the maxims of equity, this particular rule governing the
issuance of injunctions has a tautological quality. An injunction is a judicial
remedy that is, almost by definition, designed to prevent a violation of law
from occurring or recurring, or to eradicate the effects of a violation that has
already occurred. Of necessity, therefore, an injunction must be addressed
to, or fit, the violation of law. Building on this elementary understanding,
the narrow tailoring principle required that the fit be tight, and in this form
was turned into an instrument for setting aside decrees. These rulings
seemed, however, to contradict another near tautology of equity
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jurisprudence—one that requires injunctions to be broad and effective. The
remedy must be as deep and as broad as the wrong.
Faced with this conflict between the maxims of equity—one requiring a
tight fit between the violation and the remedy, and the other requiring a
broad and effective remedy—judges were put to the task of defining the
wrong or legal violations with care and precision. After all, it is the wrong
that would ultimately determine the scope and terms of the injunction. As a
result, what at first appeared to be a conflict within equity jurisprudence
concerning the appropriate scope of remedies turned out, on reflection, to be
a disagreement over substance: the nature of the violation that was to serve
as the predicate for the issuance of the injunction.
The importance of the substantive definition of the violation of law and
the emptiness of the narrow tailoring requirement—or for that matter even
its opposite, requiring a remedy to be broad and effective—became clear in
two landmark civil rights cases of the mid 1970s: Milliken v. Bradley,1 handed
down in July 1974, and Hills v. Gautreaux,2 handed down in April 1976, almost
two years later. Both addressed the permissibility of imposing a remedy for
civil rights violations that had occurred in two different cities: Chicago and
Detroit. Both involved the familiar, though conflicting, principles of equity
governing the scope of injunctions. In each, the Court came out differently.
Gautreaux arose from the practice of the Chicago Housing Authority,
acting in deference to objections from aldermen representing predominantly
white neighborhoods, which located public housing projects only in
predominantly Black neighborhoods. The aldermen assumed that in all
likelihood these housing units would primarily be utilized by Blacks.
Although the violation was in one sense narrow, the remedy in dispute was
broad. It sought to reach the United States Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development. The proposed decree required the Secretary to issue vouchers
to Black families then living in Chicago public housing that would enable
these families to move to white, presumably more upscale communities in
the suburbs surrounding the city.
Writing for the Court, Justice Potter Stewart accepted the finding by the
courts below that the Chicago Housing Authority had discriminated on the
basis of race. The accusation against the federal Secretary of Housing and
Urban Development was, however, more limited. The Secretary was only
accused of unlawfully supplying the Chicago Housing Authority with the

1
2

418 U.S. 717 (1974).
425 U.S. 284 (1976).
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funds to construct housing projects on the sites the Authority had chosen,
presumably understanding the racial dynamics underlying those choices.
The Secretary did not himself discriminate on the basis of race, he only
acquiesced in the discrimination by the local authorities. Yet in the eyes of
the Court, this acquiescence violated the Constitution and Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, and it was on the basis of this finding that an
injunction was allowed that embraced both the city and its surrounding
suburbs.
Appointed to the Supreme Court by Dwight Eisenhower in 1958,
Stewart was never a leader on the bench, although, he soon joined the
principal decisions that gave the Warren Court its distinctive identity.
Moreover, as the 1960s and early 1970s wore on, Justice Stewart maintained
a similar profile, signing on to decisions appearing to advance the
implementation of Brown v. Board of Education. For instance, Stewart joined
the Court’s 1971 ruling in the Charlotte-Mecklenburg case, upholding a farreaching judicial decree that was aimed at eradicating the vestiges of the dual
school system and that imposed a duty on the lower federal courts to achieve,
consistent with practical considerations, “the greatest possible degree of
actual desegregation.”3
In 1972, Justice Stewart, writing for the Court in a case in which a city
divided a school district into two, declared that the effect of a city’s action,
not that the city’s motivation for so acting, constituted the proper criterion
through which to evaluate compliance with a desegregation order. With that
rule in mind, he thwarted the city's effort to carve out a separate,
predominantly white school district from the larger community on the
ground that it would impede desegregation.4 Similarly, in 1973, Justice
Stewart joined a majority opinion that required the desegregation of the
Denver, Colorado schools.5 Although that school district had never been
operated on a dual basis, the school board had, with an eye toward
maintaining racial segregation, manipulated student attendance zones in a
significant portion of the district. The majority that he joined, assembled by
Justice William Brennan, viewed this act as an adequate basis for entering
the same kind of broad decree that it had entered in the Charlotte-Mecklenburg
case. Here, Brennan described it as “all-out desegregation.”6

3
4
5
6

Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 26 (1971).
Wright v. City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972).
Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
Id. at 214.
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The very next year, however, Justice Stewart reversed course when, in
July 1974, the Court handed down its ruling in the Detroit school
desegregation case.7 He then broke from Brennan, Marshall, Douglas, and
White—all of whom dissented in that case—and provided the crucial fifth
vote for the four Nixon appointees—Burger, Blackmun, Rehnquist, and
Powell—in barring a metropolitan remedy—a desegregation plan that
embraced the city and suburban schools (the Detroit metropolitan area).
Although Stewart concurred in the judgment of the Court, he refused to join
the opinion written by Chief Justice Burger. Instead, he wrote a separate
concurrence and in that opinion invoked the authority of what he called
“equity jurisdiction”8 and the narrow tailoring requirement. As Stewart
reasoned, because the violations had occurred within Detroit, the remedy
must be confined to Detroit.
As with Gautreaux, Milliken v. Bradley reached the Supreme Court before
the lower courts had settled on the metropolitan remedy. In Gautreaux, the
Supreme Court allowed the lower courts to formulate the appropriate
remedy, though it explicitly contemplated and legitimated the entry of a
decree against the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development that, in
effect, reached beyond the bounds of the city of Chicago. Under that order,
vouchers were to be issued to public housing residents then living in Chicago
so that they could move to the surrounding suburbs. The majority did not
take the same stance in Milliken v. Bradley. On the contrary, the majority in
Milliken prevented the entry of any remedial order that would have embraced
the surrounding, predominantly white, suburban school districts.
In order to highlight this contrast with Gautreaux, imagine that in Milliken
the parties had sought an injunction requiring the State of Michigan to
redraw the school districts covering the larger Detroit metropolitan area,
suburbs included, in such a way as to facilitate “all-out desegregation” (to use
the formula of the Denver case) or “the greatest possible degree of actual
desegregation” (to use the formula of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg case). The
State of Michigan—already a party to the suit, represented by the Governor
William Milliken—was fully vested with the authority to draw school district
boundaries and was under no obligation under state law to confine those
boundaries to the various political subdivisions of the State. In fact, the
boundaries of school districts and political subdivisions often diverged. In
drawing the boundaries of school districts, the State normally considered a

7
8

Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
Id. at 753 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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whole host of factors, some concerning the distribution of school-aged
children, others concerning financial considerations, and still others
concerning the bounds of the various communities. Under the proposed
decree, these considerations remain germane, but would have to be adjusted
or modified to reflect the federal constitutional imperative of racial
integration.
Consistent with well-established practice in school desegregation cases,
the State of Michigan would in the first instance be given an opportunity to
put forth a plan that would fulfill its constitutional obligation. Specifically,
the plan would identify the geographic boundaries of the new proposed
school districts consistent with the aim of achieving, in the terms of CharlotteMecklenburg, “the greatest possible degree of actual desegregation.” As
appellate courts often do, the Supreme Court could also set the parameters
of the desegregation plan Michigan was to formulate and submit in the first
instance to the district court. Specifically, the Supreme Court could require
that the new districts be as geographically compact as possible, so as to
minimize transportation to and from schools, which, in any event, should be
no more than thirty minutes. The Court could also specifically require that
the plan allow persons living within each school district to elect a school
board to govern the district, and further provide that these boards be vested
with the same power as local school boards now possess over curriculum,
personnel, budget, and the construction of new schools.
Once the required plan was submitted by the State to the district court,
that court would then hold a hearing to determine its adequacy. At this
proceeding, all parties potentially affected by the proposal, including
representatives of the old districts and various political subdivisions of the
metropolitan area, would be allowed to participate. In the end, the district
court would have to decide whether the plan is an effective and appropriately
tailored instrument for eradicating the constitutional violation—the
segregated pattern of student attendance in the Detroit metropolitan area.
Assuming the Supreme Court’s ruling in Milliken barred the entry of such
a decree, the question naturally arose in Gautreaux whether an analogous
metropolitan remedy against the Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development, this time to hold him accountable for his complicity in the
wrongs that had occurred in Chicago, was permissible. Presenting the case
for the Secretary at oral argument, Robert Bork, then Solicitor General,
relied on Milliken v. Bradley, insisting that the metropolitan remedy sought in
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Gautreaux against the Secretary, “no matter how gently it’s gone about,”
would offend the value of “local autonomy” protected by Milliken.9
It is unusual for a Justice to quote in the body of an opinion a statement
made by the Solicitor General in the heat of argument. In this instance, the
literary device was used not as a gesture of respect. It seemed instead to have
been deployed either to correct a widespread misapprehension or possibly to
add emphasis to the point the Justice wished to make, for in the end, Stewart
repudiated Bork’s reading of Milliken and denied that Milliken was predicated
on a desire to protect the value of local autonomy. In saying this, Justice
Stewart spoke with special authority for he was the Court’s crucial fifth vote
responsible for the ruling in Milliken.
Admittedly, the other four who constituted the Milliken majority were
represented by the Chief Justice’s opinion—properly characterized as a
plurality opinion—that emphasized the importance of local control in the
field of education. Yet a metropolitan remedy along the lines I indicated—
but that was precluded by the majority in Milliken consisting of Stewart,
Burger, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist—would leave the governance of
the public schools in the hands of locally elected school boards. Under the
decree I imagined local autonomy would not have been threatened, only
reconfigured. Localism would have been given a new face. Earlier the State
of Michigan had drawn the boundaries of the school districts, and now the
State was being asked to redraw them in a way that served a supervening and
commanding federal constitutional purpose—“to achieve the greatest
possible degree of actual desegregation.”
In an attempt to differentiate the metropolitan remedy contemplated in
these two cases—Milliken v. Bradley and Gautreaux—Stewart pointed to the
different impact each would have had on existing units of local government.
In Gautreaux, recipients of housing vouchers provided by the Secretary of
Housing and Urban Development would have been able to move to a new
town. The metropolitan remedy in Milliken v. Bradley, however, would have
required a measure of government reorganization: redrawing the boundaries
of the school districts covering the Detroit metropolitan area. Granted, this
is a difference, and yet it is difficult to understand the significance of that
difference. That is why the three Milliken dissenters who were still on the
Court in 1976—Brennan, Marshall, and White (the fourth, Douglas, had
already stepped down)—found it necessary to write a separate concurrence
in Gautreaux. Although they joined Stewart’s opinion, as did all the other
9

Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 300–01.
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Justices, they also indicated that they adhered to the views they had expressed
in Milliken v. Bradley. The existing school district boundaries were once drawn
by the State of Michigan and the State retained ample power to redraw them.
For them, the existing boundaries possessed no sanctity. Nor can we find in
the grab-bag of equity jurisprudence any principle that would attribute
significance to Stewart’s distinction. As Justice Stewart fully recognized in
Gautreaux, although one principle requires that remedies be narrowly tailored,
another requires that they be broad and effective.
In truth, the difference between Stewart’s position in Gautreaux and his
position in Milliken is best explained by his understanding of the constitutional
wrong, not these warring tautologies drawn from equity jurisprudence. The
Gautreaux Court deemed the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
complicit in the unconstitutional practice of situating public housing projects
most likely to be used by Blacks in neighborhoods that were already Black or
quickly becoming Black. Stewart conceived of the underlying violation by
the Chicago Housing Authority in near-atomistic terms and then approved
of a broad, ambitious remedy. He thus allowed—and here he spoke for a
unanimous Court—the metropolitan remedy in Gautreaux on the theory that
it was an appropriate, though strikingly ambitious, instrument for correcting
that clear violation of equal protection by the Chicago Housing Authority.
It provided a portion of the Black community required to live in these racially
segregated housing projects with an opportunity to enhance their chance for
upward mobility by moving to predominantly white, presumably upscale
suburban communities.10 Although the Chicago Housing Authority was
charged and found guilty of perpetuating segregation based on race, the
Secretary merely agreed to fund the housing projects and the Chicago
Housing Authority’s segregative action.
The Milliken violation was harder to pin down. It was not feasible to
accuse the State of Michigan of intentionally drawing the existing school
district boundaries on the basis of race—white children in one district, Black
children in another. Its failure was essentially the failure of inaction: failure
to redraw the district lines in a way that might account for shifting residential
patterns and provide for integrated public education in the Detroit
metropolitan area. As Justice Marshall aptly and passionately complained in
dissent in Milliken, with an authority that only he possessed, this inaction
prevented children from learning together, and then he added, “. . . unless

10

See generally OWEN FISS, A WAY OUT: AMERICA’S GHETTOS AND THE LEGACY OF RACISM (2003).
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our children begin to learn together, there is little hope that our people will
ever learn to live together.”11
In Milliken Stewart denied that the Constitution obligated the State to
make these adjustments, even though the consequence was entirely
foreseeable and avoidable: an increasingly all-Black school district for the city
of Detroit, surrounded by predominantly white suburban school districts.
For him, the mere fact of different racial compositions in contiguous districts
did not itself imply or constitute a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
Admittedly, rigid adherence to the existing boundaries may have facilitated
or enabled white flight from the city. But Stewart did not demand that
Michigan correct it. For Stewart, a decree requiring such corrective action
would be justifiable where the State of Michigan had “imposed, fostered, or
encouraged” the demographic pattern of segregation in the public schools of
the metropolitan area.12 He searched for a wrong by the State of Michigan
that had the same atomistic quality as the wrong he later found to have been
committed by the Chicago Housing Authority in Gautreaux.
The Detroit school board is an instrumentality of the State of Michigan.
As such, the State can presumably be held accountable for the school board’s
wrongdoing within the Detroit school district. According to Justice Stewart,
this wrongdoing of the Detroit board consisted of the “improper use of
zoning and attendance patterns, optional-attendance areas, and building and
site selection.”13 By acquiescing in or failing to correct the local board’s
segregative actions, the State, much like the Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development in Gautreaux, could have been deemed complicit in the
wrongdoing within the Detroit school district. On this theory, the Court
could have required the State of Michigan to stop those transgressions and
even more, to take action that would eradicate the effects of such
transgressions. But what, one may ask, are the consequences of these
transgressions?
One year earlier, the Court, with the unqualified support of Stewart, held
that similarly improper acts of segregation in part of the Denver school
district warranted an order requiring “all-out desegregation” of the entire
district. Writing for the Denver majority, Justice Brennan reasoned that
going forward the improper segregative acts of the past cast doubt upon the
integrity of the board’s stated policy of assigning students to schools based on
11
12
13

Milliken, 418 U.S. at 783 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 758 (Stewart, J., concurring).
Id. at 753 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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their geographic proximity to a school. These past segregative acts also
might well have had, Brennan reasoned, an effect on residential patterns
throughout the school district. The causal assumptions upon which
Brennan’s theory rested were a bit of a stretch; in all likelihood the segregated
residential patterns of Denver were attributable to a large complex of factors,
many of which were unrelated to the past segregative acts of the school
board. In the Denver case, Stewart was prepared to indulge them. He was
not, however, similarly inclined in the Detroit case, where he broke from
Brennan and the other three carry overs from the Warren Court—William
Douglas, Thurgood Marshall, and Byron White.
In Milliken, Stewart justified his refusal to embrace the causal assumptions
underlying the Denver decision because of one pivotal difference: Milliken
dealt not with racially segregated neighborhoods within a single city, but an
increasingly Black city surrounded by white suburbs. In a footnote
specifically addressed to “My Brother Marshall,” Stewart insisted that
“segregative acts within the city alone cannot be presumed—and no factual
showing was made that they do produce—an increase in the number of
Negro students in the city as a whole.”14 He then continued:
It is this essential fact of a predominantly Negro school population in
Detroit—caused by unknown and perhaps unknowable factors such
as in-migration, birth rates, economic changes, or the cumulation of
private acts of racial fears—that accounts for the “growing core of
Negro schools,” a “core” that has grown to include virtually the entire
city.15
Marshall and the others who followed him in dissent did not deny the
multitude of causal factors that account for the shifting demographic pattern
of the Detroit metropolitan area. The Milliken dissenters instead focused on
student attendance patterns of the public schools, and were prepared to
attribute a significant measure of responsibility to the State of Michigan for
those patterns—Blacks in one set of schools (the city), whites in another (the
suburbs). The responsibility of the State for these racial attendance patterns
arose in part from the housing policies of various government agencies and
other instrumentalities of the State of Michigan.16 More generally, the
responsibility of the State could be attributed to its decision, in the face of
shifting residential patterns, to make the boundaries of the Detroit school
district coterminous with the city of Detroit and then to adhere to that
14
15
16

Id. at 756 n.2 (emphasis omitted).
Id.
See generally RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW OUR
GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA (2017).
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decision knowing full well what would be the consequence of that decision—
racially segregated schools in the metropolitan area taken as a whole.17
Going further, one could say, as Thurgood Marshall and other dissenters
well understood, that by rigidly adhering to the decision to make the
boundaries of the Detroit school district coterminous with the boundaries of
the municipality, the State endowed those families that had the necessary
economic resources—disproportionately whites—with the power to avoid
going to predominantly Black, inner-city schools. They only had to move to
one of the many suburbs surrounding the city.
Milliken v. Bradley was no ordinary decision. It confined Brown v. Board of
Education to a rule condemning segregated patterns of student attendance
produced by racial assignments and it thus became a turning point in the
history of school desegregation.18 It constitutionalized the difference between
de jure and so-called de facto segregation. It also greatly enhanced the
saliency of the tailoring principle and at the same time revealed the vacuity
of that principle. One of the Justices who was essential to the majority—
Potter Stewart—filed a separate concurrence that focused on the tailoring
principle and maintained that this principle was the basis of his decision. On
closer inspection, however, it appears that his decision turned not on the
instrumental character of the remedy being sought—is it narrow enough?—
but rather on a theory—advanced in a couple of sentences in one footnote—
of urban development, the meaning of equal protection, and the role of the
judiciary in American society. Stewart refused to treat the demographic
pattern of student attendance—Black students in one set of schools, whites in
another—as a constitutional wrong.
THE WORKINGS OF STRICT SCRUTINY
In 1975 William Douglas stepped down from the Court. He had
dissented in Milliken v. Bradley in a way that repudiated the purported
distinction between de facto and de jure school segregation, and emphasized
the responsibility of the State for entirely foreseeable and avoidable
consequences of its districting decisions on the racial pattern of student
attendance. The year before, Douglas had taken a similar position in a
17

18

In the 1973 Denver case, Justice Powell acknowledged the responsibility of the local school boards
for the segregated attendance patterns in the district for this very reason. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 241
(1973) (Powell, J., concurring). A year later, in the Detroit case, he quietly abandoned that position
and without comment joined the Chief Justice’s opinion.
See generally Myron Orfield, Milliken, Meredith, and Metropolitan Segregation, 62 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 364
(2015).
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separate concurrence in the Denver case, though he also joined Brennan’s
opinion for the Court. At the time of Justice Douglas’s retirement, Gerald
Ford, Nixon’s vice president—and before that the leader of the Republican
minority in the House of Representatives—was in the White House. Guided
by Edward Levi, once the President of the University of Chicago, now
Attorney General, Ford filled Douglas’s seat with John Paul Stevens, a
Republican who was then sitting on the Seventh Circuit. Stevens did not
participate in Gautreaux.
The personnel changes on the Supreme Court during the 1970s were, to
some degree, reflected in the outcome of Milliken v. Bradley, since all the Nixon
appointees voted against allowing a metropolitan school desegregation
remedy. The setback to the course of racial equality represented by that
decision was soon reinforced and amplified by two decisions in 1976, not
Gautreaux, which, in retrospect seemed like a miracle, but rather Washington v.
Davis and Rizzo v. Goode. The first downgraded the disparate impact doctrine
governing employment discrimination cases from a constitutional to a
statutory rule.19 The other set aside a structural injunction aimed at
protecting Blacks from abuses by the then-notorious Philadelphia Police
Department.20
From 1974 onward, the Court was dominated by a group of Justices who
were appointed by President Nixon, though, as already noted, one, Harry
Blackmun, soon strayed and primarily aligned himself with Brennan and
Marshall. The new conservative-leaning phalanx, however, was able to form
alliances with more moderate and accommodating holdovers from the
Warren Court, namely Potter Stewart and Byron White. Stewart provided
the fifth vote in Milliken. Justice White wrote the majority opinion in
Washington v. Davis and Stewart joined the essential sections of that opinion.
Both joined Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in Rizzo v. Goode.
Starting in the 1980s and continuing well into the twenty-first century,
this more conservative wing of the Court was supplemented by the
appointees of Presidents Ronald Reagan (1980-1986), George H. W. Bush
(1986-1992), George W. Bush (2000-2008), and more recently Donald
Trump (2016-2020). Of course, a number of these individuals who were
appointed by Republican presidents went the way of Harry Blackmun. John
Paul Stevens, for example, often sided with the liberal bloc, especially in the
later years of his tenure. So did David Souter, who had been appointed by
19
20

Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); see Owen Fiss, The Accumulation of Disadvantages, 106 CAL.
L. REV. 1945 (2018).
Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); see Owen Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 YALE L.J. 1103, 1154-61 (1977).
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the first President Bush. In the election of 1976, Jimmy Carter, a Democrat,
beat Gerald Ford, but, through a quirk of history, no vacancies occurred
during his presidency. Later, two Democratic Presidents, Bill Clinton (19922000) and Barack Obama (2008-2016), made a number of appointments to
the Supreme Court as well. These appointments were not, however, able to
alter the fundamental shift in the Court’s civil rights jurisprudence and to
restore it to the point where it had been before the mid-1970s.
Even after the personnel change on the Court that occurred in the 1970s,
the great civil rights acts of the 1960s remained on the books. They were
enforced by lawsuits brought by personal victims, and now and then by
litigation initiated by the Department of Justice. These statutes were
supplemented by a number of enactments, principally the 1982
Amendments of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,21 the Civil Rights Restoration
Act of 1987,22 and the Civil Rights Act of 1991,23 all of which were enacted
when Democrats controlled Congress. These measures did not, however,
add significant dimensions to the Second Reconstruction or revitalize it in
any meaningful sense. They sought only to correct the allegedly errant ways
of the Republican-dominated Supreme Court on those occasions when
Congress took issue with the Court’s interpretation of the great civil rights
acts of the 1960s and the doctrines to which those statutes gave rise. Notably,
no statute was passed by Congress to transcend or modify the effect of the
Court’s decision in Milliken v. Bradley—to impose a higher standard on school
boards than the Court construed the Constitution to impose.
In truth, the momentum of the Second Reconstruction during the phase
of the Supreme Court’s history that began in the mid-1970s was primarily
maintained by state and local governments, and by various institutions of
civil society, including the leading universities of the nation. Legally
enforceable obligations to further racial justice had virtually been reduced to
naught, certainly in the field of public education, and as a result the primary
constitutional question facing the Supreme Court during the epoch that
began in the mid-1970s was, and continues to be, one of permission: does the
Equal Protection Clause allow the reconstructive measures that these
institutions adopted?
In resolving this question, the Supreme Court has generally been guided
by a legal test or heuristic—strict scrutiny. This test has been treated as more
than an evidentiary rule calling for a searching, hard-nosed factual inquiry
21
22
23

Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (1982).
Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988).
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1070 (1991)
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to determine whether the particular measure before the Court benefited
rather than disadvantaged Blacks. Rather, it has been used to determine
whether a contested reconstructive measure—even if it can be assumed to
improve the status of Blacks—is consistent with equal protection. Strict
scrutiny has been used as a substantive, rather than evidentiary, test and as
such required that the measure in question serve a compelling public purpose
and be narrowly tailored to achieve that purpose. In this way, the narrow
tailoring requirement found a new home. It became a component of strict
scrutiny and turned out to be a favorite of Justice Anthony Kennedy.
Kennedy was appointed to the Court by President Reagan in February
1988 and, over the next thirty years on the bench, he invoked the narrow
tailoring component of strict scrutiny in a wide variety of cases, including
affirmative action24 and electoral districting.25 It allowed him to navigate
between the warring factions that divided his colleagues and enabled him to
appear as a centrist or moderate.26 To me, however, Kennedy’s most
revealing application of the narrow tailoring requirement occurred in the
2007 Parents Involved case,27 where he cast the decisive fifth vote to invalidate
the modest desegregation plans that had been adopted by the Seattle and
Louisville school districts. An examination of that ruling, and in particular
Justice Kennedy’s separate concurring opinion, will reveal the circumstances
that gave narrow tailoring such great prominence in recent decades and how
the Justice transformed it into a platform for advancing his own moralistic
meanderings.
By the time Parents Involved reached the Supreme Court, Brown v. Board of
Education had been thoroughly ravaged. After Milliken v. Bradley, it was no
longer thought affirmatively to compel integration. Rather, it was viewed as
a narrow prohibition on the use of race to segregate students. As a purely
technical matter, Milliken v. Bradley addressed only the issue of metropolitan
desegregation, but it was almost immediately understood to extend much
further, defining the obligation of school boards acting within the bounds of
their own districts.28 In legal terms, de jure segregation was unconstitutional
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and had to be stopped. Yet no such obligation was imposed on so-called de
facto segregation—the racially segregated demographic pattern resulting
from the assignment of students to schools in their neighborhoods in a district
where the residential patterns are racially segregated.
Even after Milliken v. Bradley, the rulings in the Charlotte-Mecklenburg
and Denver cases remained on the books. These two rulings condemned
segregated patterns of student attendance resulting from a confluence of
neighborhood school policies and residential segregation. One required, as
we saw, “the greatest possible degree of actual desegregation,” the other
called for “all-out desegregation.” These decisions assumed, however, that
the segregated patterns of student attendance were vestiges of past racial
assignments—the various schools were either endowed by the racial
assignments with a racial identity or neighborhoods were formed by those
assignments so as to create segregated residential patterns. But as time wore
on, it became increasingly difficult, almost impossible, to view the
demographic student attendance patterns—white students in one set of
schools, Black students in another—as primarily a vestige of earlier, longprohibited racial assignments. The causal assumptions underlying such a
characterization simply became untenable. As a result, by the 1990s, Brown
was no longer seen as a vital source of a legally enforceable obligation to
integrate public schools or, to use the Charlotte-Mecklenburg formula, to create
“the greatest possible degree of actual desegregation.”
Although Milliken and the decisions that followed in its wake diluted the
force of Brown, they did not define the entire field of action for local school
boards. These decisions determined what was required, not what was
permissible. Local school boards were still free to try, as a matter of policy,
to take steps that would avoid or at least minimize racially segregated
patterns of student attendance. As with any policy decision, local school
boards were hemmed in by practical necessities and the vicissitudes of
politics. Nonetheless, some, like those in Seattle and Louisville, forged ahead,
doing what they could to integrate their schools.
As a general matter, the Seattle and Louisville school boards assigned
students to schools on the basis of their residence. Given the racial character
of these cities’ residential patterns, it was no surprise that the neighborhood
school assignment policy produced racially segregated patterns of student
attendance. That in turn led these two school boards to institute a transfer

the great significance of that decision for the law of school desegregation. Hart v. Cmty. Sch. Bd.,
383 F. Supp. 769 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
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program—the point of contention in Parents Involved—that might, to a modest
degree, enhance the possibility of racial integration. Under this program
white students would be given a priority in transferring to predominantly
Black schools and Black students would be given a priority in transferring to
predominantly white schools.
Under the terms of this transfer program, the right to transfer depended
on the availability of space in the receiving school. If the number of students
applying for those openings exceeded the number of available seats, priority
was given first to applicants with a sibling in the receiving school; then to
applicants who lived closest to the receiving school; and finally to those
applicants who would be considered a racial minority in the receiving school.
Application of this third transfer criterion required knowledge of the
applicant’s race and the receiving school’s racial composition. Since this
information was used to allocate a scarce opportunity, the prevailing
Supreme Court doctrine required assessment under strict scrutiny.
Chief Justice Roberts announced the Court’s decision invalidating the
Seattle/Louisville transfer program. Only three other Justices—Antonin
Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel Alito—joined the opinion Roberts
filed to support the Court’s ruling. In this opinion, the Chief Justice first
addressed whether the transfer program served a compelling public purpose.
In so doing, he came to a remarkable conclusion: forget whether school
integration is compelling, it is not even legitimate. In expressing that view,
Roberts employed a literary device unworthy of a Chief Justice of the United
States. Instead of speaking of integration or “actual desegregation,” he
referred to “racial balance.”29 This term had been employed in the 1960s
and 1970s, mostly in political circles, by the critics of Brown v. Board of
Education, who sought to confine that decision to its narrowest possible
compass and reduce it to a ban on racial assignments. As those critics
proclaimed, Brown prohibited segregation but did not require integration.
Justice Kennedy saw through Chief Justice Roberts’s rhetorical strategy.
In a separate concurrence, Kennedy openly spoke of integration and “racial
isolation,” a term first introduced by the United States Commission on Civil
Rights in the mid-1960s during the debates over the legality of de facto
segregation.30 The opening of Kennedy’s opinion was remarkably bold: he
declared that the Chief Justice was “profoundly mistaken” in his belief that
school integration is not even a legitimate, let alone compelling, public
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purpose.31 This enabled Justice Kennedy to frame his application of strict
scrutiny as it should have been framed—by openly acknowledging the
importance, indeed the urgency, of Black and white students attending
school together and the constitutional source of his belief. As he put it in the
closing movement of his opinion: “This Nation has a moral and ethical
obligation to fulfill its historic commitment to creating an integrated society
that ensures equal opportunity for all of its children.”32
Given this belief, Kennedy felt the need to address the distinction
between de facto and de jure segregation. Although he endorsed that
distinction, his reason for doing so did not in any way undermine his
conviction that school integration or the elimination of racial isolation is a
compelling public purpose. Kennedy acknowledged that segregation
produced by racial assignments and segregation produced by a
neighborhood school plan in districts with racially segregated neighborhoods
affect the lives of children attending these schools in nearly identical ways.
Yet he feared that condemning de facto segregation as a constitutional
matter—and thus abolishing the legal distinction between it and de jure
segregation—would, in effect, put the judiciary at the forefront of a massive
reconstructive endeavor: making certain that we have not white schools, not
Black schools, but just schools. Such an enlargement of judicial authority
would, Kennedy concluded, offend his understanding of the judiciary’s
proper role in a democracy or, put differently, violate Separation of Powers
principles.
In the end, Justice Kennedy refused to condemn school segregation taken
as a demographic pattern as violative of the Equal Protection Clause. He
was prepared, however, to recognize integration, or the eradication of de
facto segregation and racial isolation (to use the legalistic circumlocutions),
as a legitimate, indeed compelling, purpose. What’s more, he seemed to
welcome remedial action to further that purpose by the more political
branches of government, local and federal. Everything turned on the means
chosen.
In his Parents Involved concurrence, Kennedy specifically endorsed the
right of the school board to adjust geographic attendance zones in such a way
as to increase racial integration.33 He also explicitly approved of the practice
of locating new schools at sites that would serve the same end. In these
instances, the school boards would be very much aware of the impact that
31
32
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their decisions would have on the racial make-up of the student body—
choices would be made based on the racial composition of the district’s
various neighborhoods. In this way, race would be used, but not as a
criterion for allocating a scarce opportunity to one individual as opposed to
another. These integrative strategies would not entail racial classifications as
that term is ordinarily understood. Accordingly, Kennedy found these
particular methods of achieving integration entirely unobjectionable, not
even subject to strict scrutiny. He rejected the notion that the state must be
colorblind or that any measure predicated on an assessment of its impact on
racial groups is especially suspicious.
On the other hand, Justice Kennedy put the Seattle/Louisville transfer
program at issue in Parents Involved in another category. Because it classified
individuals on the basis of race and then allocated scarce opportunities in
accordance with these classifications, it should be subject, he felt, to strict
scrutiny. As such, the transfer program could only be upheld if it was
narrowly tailored and, in the end, Kennedy concluded that, because it
employed racial classifications, it failed to satisfy the narrow tailoring
component of strict scrutiny. The transfer program gave a Black applicant
priority over a white applicant when both sought to transfer to a
predominantly white school or gave a white applicant priority over a Black
applicant when both sought to transfer to a predominantly Black school. For
this reason, Kennedy provided the decisive fifth vote against the transfer
program, effectively invalidating it as a matter of law.
Justice Kennedy thus used the presence of a racial classification in the
Seattle/Louisville transfer program for two distinct purposes: first, to trigger
strict scrutiny and second, to invalidate the program on the grounds that it
was not narrowly tailored. In a number of instances, Kennedy justified on
largely pragmatic grounds the rule making the presence of racial
classifications into a trigger for strict scrutiny: racial classifications enhanced
divisiveness and therefore, according to Kennedy, any measure that
employed them, even if it improves the status of Blacks, should be strictly
scrutinized.34 In Parents Involved, Kennedy went one step further and relied a
moral objection to racial classifications as the ground for invalidating the
Seattle/Louisville transfer program under the narrow tailoring component
of strict scrutiny. As he there put it, the use of race in the Seattle/Louisville
transfer program reduces individual applicants to “racial chits valued and
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traded according to one school’s supply and another’s demand.”35 Such
“race typing” of individuals by a state agency was, Kennedy concluded in
the decisive turn of his Parent’s Involved analysis, “inconsistent with the dignity
of individuals in our society.”36
The language Justice Kennedy used to describe the workings of the
Seattle/Louisville transfer program—“race typing,” reducing individuals to
“racial chits,” and having school authorities abide by a strange law of
“supply” and “demand”—is indeed captivating. Yet it seems exaggerated.
Identifying an individual’s race as white or Black is sometimes challenging,
especially in modern times, as the rate of marriage between whites and Blacks
increases. But categorizing individuals on the basis of their race is a common
practice of school administrators and often occurs in government surveys like
the United States Census. Justice Kennedy has never insisted on
colorblindness in an epistemological sense.
Admittedly, practical consequences flow from the racial classifications
called for by the contested transfer program, but they hardly reduce
applicants who wish to transfer to “racial chits,” no more than the feature of
the transfer program that creates a preference for those applicants who have
a sibling in the receiving school reduces the individuals subject to that rule to
“chits” of another variety. No one would be demeaned by using race as an
allocative criterion in administering the transfer program. It would be well
understood that school authorities are simply gathering information
necessary to enhance the integrated character of the educational program
they offered. In so doing, they would not be responding to a watered-down
version of the law of supply and demand that ordinarily governs economic
transactions; they would only be passing over those applicants whose transfer
would not further the goal of promoting racial integration in their schools.
Four Justices dissented. Two—Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen
Breyer—were appointed to the Court by a Democrat, Bill Clinton. A
third—David Souter—owed his appointment to a Republican president,
George W. H. Bush. The fourth—John Paul Stevens—had been appointed
by yet another Republican president, Gerald Ford. Breyer’s opinion, which
the other three Justices joined, became the principal dissent. Surprisingly,
Breyer did not express, in any clear and obvious way, qualms about
Kennedy’s morally charged description of the Seattle/Louisville transfer
program. In fact, Breyer seemed to concede that denying transfer
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applications on the basis of race in the way Seattle and Louisville
contemplated would inflict a harm on society and perhaps on the individuals
who might have applied for a transfer—he called it a “cost.”37
In the end, Breyer concluded that this harm was dwarfed by the harms
that the school authorities were trying to counter by increasing the integrated
character of the education they offered. Although Breyer’s dissent is
exceedingly long (nearly eighty pages), his discussion of Justice Kennedy’s
objection to the Seattle/Louisville transfer program essentially consists of two
sentences (interrupted only by a page reference to the nub of Kennedy’s
discussion): “This is not to deny that there is a cost in applying ‘a statemandated racial label.’ But that cost does not approach, in degree or in kind,
the terrible harms of slavery, the resulting caste system, and the 80 years of
legal racial segregation.”38 The reader is left to draw his or her own
conclusion about the balance of costs and benefits.
In couching his response to Kennedy in these terms, Breyer seems to have
ignored the fact that Kennedy was not making a general ethical claim about
the balance of costs and benefits. Rather, Kennedy was pinning his dignitybased objection to the transfer program on the narrow tailoring requirement,
which is governed by a distinctive internal logic. In the context of strict
scrutiny, narrow tailoring does no more than restrict the means used to
achieve a compelling public purpose; it demands that the means chosen by
the government be necessary to the attainment of the compelling public
purpose. Faithful to the instrumental logic of narrow tailoring, and almost
in conversation with Breyer’s reminder about the burden of our history and
the urgent need for school integration, Kennedy added: “Even so, measures
other than differential treatment based on racial typing of individuals must
first be exhausted.”39 As it turned out, Kennedy’s objection to so-called racial
typing was only an exhaustion requirement—avoid it if you can; try
something else first.
This downward adjustment to the rigor of Kennedy’s objection to the
Seattle/Louisville transfer program made that objection more palatable. Yet
it exposed a fault line that ran throughout Kennedy’s entire approach—his
decision to attach to the narrow tailoring requirement an objection to the
transfer program that was based on a proper regard for human dignity. For
one thing, it is difficult to understand how such a dignitary-based objection
could ever be defeated or even ignored simply because the contested state
37
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measure is deemed instrumentally necessary to the attainment of a
compelling public purpose. Typically, respect for human dignity calls for
more absolute constraints, as we can see in the case of torture. Torture is
almost universally proscribed on the ground that it is an offense to human
dignity and as a result, it is not allowed even when it turns out that torture is
the only way of obtaining information needed to avoid a greater harm, such
as the killing of another, or even the killing of a number of people.40 I would
therefore say that appending the dignitary-based objection to the narrow
tailoring requirement, in effect, debases what we might expect from an
ethical or even a constitutional rule founded on a respect for human dignity.
Even more, it compromises the integrity of the narrow tailoring requirement.
The narrow tailoring requirement constitutes the instrumental
component of strict scrutiny. It calls for an exercise of means-end rationality
and a judgment of whether the means chosen by the state to pursue a public
purpose is as exacting as it could be. Granted, the insistence on a tight fit
between means and ends is grounded in an overarching moral purpose: to
minimize the infringement of the underlying constitutional norms. Respect
for narrow tailoring might, in that way, enlarge the enjoyment of equal
protection. Yet narrow tailoring is not the domain in which independent
normative judgments are to be made. Indeed, I would say that such
judgments are extraneous to narrow tailoring. These judgments are to be
made by the exercise of substantive rationality, in which reason is used to
examine the desirability and importance of the ends that might be pursued
by the state.
The internal logic and structure of the narrow tailoring requirement
might be best illustrated by an example outside the school desegregation
context.41 Imagine that two police officers are killed in a drive-by shooting
while they are sitting in their patrol car. The mayor and the police chief,
indeed the entire force, are outraged, determined to apprehend the
perpetrators of this crime. A witness to the shooting describes the killers as
two young Black men. In response to this information the police chief
launches a massive manhunt in the city’s predominantly Black
neighborhood. Young Black men are picked up on the streets, detained for
questioning, and their alibis are checked. Without prior notice and at all
hours of the day, squads of police officers demand entry into apartments in
40
41
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the Black neighborhood, searching for the killers. Members of the Black
community then bring suit to stop this aggressive manhunt and the dragnet
search that it entailed. Finally, let us also assume that the lawsuit alleges that
such police action constitutes a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
In our hypothetical scenario, the police used race in a pronounced way:
to define targets of the manhunt. Accordingly, both the decision that
launched the search and the directive governing its implementation would
be closely scrutinized. In applying the strict scrutiny test, the court must first
exercise substantive rationality. It must assess the permissibility or worthiness
of the purpose underlying the police chief’s decision to so deploy his force in
the way he did. Presumably, the court would deem this purpose—to ensure
the safety of the police and the community in general—compelling. The
question would then arise as to whether the means the police adopted—the
race-based manhunt and dragnet—to achieve this compelling public
purpose is narrowly tailored. Are there other techniques or strategies that
might have been used to locate the killers that would have been less grossly
offensive to equal protection? Track the car. Check the surveillance
cameras. Search for neighbors in the vicinity who might have seen the
killing. Offer high rewards for information leading to the arrest and
conviction of the killers.
In this example, the narrow tailoring requirement safeguards the values
protected by the Equal Protection Clause. It requires the state to avoid those
practices that perpetuate the subjugation of the Black community. Other
constitutional norms—for example, the Fourth Amendment prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures—might also be offended by the
manhunt and dragnet search. Those additional provisions might be invoked,
either by the parties or the court itself, and co-joined with the equal
protection claim and if so, these provisions might act as independent,
alternative sources of values that the court might seek to vindicate. Under
no circumstances, however, should the values protected by these alternative
constitutional provisions, such as the Fourth Amendment, be smuggled into
the court’s equal protection analysis though an application of the narrow
tailoring component of strict scrutiny.
Similarly, even if Justice Kennedy was right in objecting to the
Seattle/Louisville transfer program on the ground that it offends human
dignity, such a judgment—most certainly an exercise of substantive
rationality—should not be smuggled into his equal protection analysis
through the application of the narrow tailoring requirement. This, mind
you, is not a plea for analytic clarity for the sake of analytic clarity. Much
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more is at stake. Kennedy’s use of the narrow tailoring requirement as a
platform for moralizing obscured, possibly even masked, the true nature of
his judgment. It allowed him to present a deeply normative judgment as
though it were only an instrumental, highly technical one about the
relationship between means and ends. Using the narrow tailoring
requirement in this way also relieved Kennedy of his responsibility to locate,
with some precision, the constitutional provision or provisions that guarantee
the protection of human dignity, which turns out to be the true source of his
decision to strike down the Seattle/Louisville transfer program.
Some countries have included a prohibition against governmental action
that offends human dignity in their constitutions. The German Constitution
contains such a provision. The United States Constitution does not. In the
face of this lacunae, some jurists have insisted that a respect for human
dignity is implicit within the American Constitution; it is as a foundational
value that pervades each and every provision, especially the Bill of Rights
and Civil War Amendments, and should therefore guide their
interpretation.42 There is much to this view. Not so much, however, when
it is used to turn the Equal Protection Clause into a rule that prevents school
authorities from desegregating their schools as fully as they might. Such rule
ignores the offense to human dignity arguably arising from the maintenance
of racially segregated schools and the perpetuation of the caste structure
attributable to such a practice. It also prevents local school authorities from
taking action that appears to further the central purpose of the Equal
Protection Clause and for that very reason deemed to serve a compelling
public purpose. Kennedy’s well-known fascination with dignity had always
seemed admirable to me, especially when used to protect marginalized
groups, but in this instance it seems to have gotten completely out of hand.
This criticism of Justice Kennedy’s stance in Parents Involved is largely
premised on the view, based on the historical record, that the overarching
purpose of the Equal Protection Clause is to prevent the state from taking
any action that would aggravate, or even perpetuate, the havoc wreaked
upon the Black community by the centuries-old institution of slavery.43 Of
course, some of the Justices responsible for the Parents Involved ruling might
42
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dispute this understanding of the Equal Protection Clause’s basic purpose. I
take that to be the necessary implication of the now-famous quip with which
Chief Justice Roberts concluded his opinion: the only way to end
discrimination is to stop discriminating.44 I further assume that the three
Justices who joined the Chief Justice’s opinion—Scalia, Thomas, and Alito—
shared in this sentiment. For them, the overarching purpose of the Equal
Protection Clause is to prevent discrimination based on race: a process as
opposed to the unfortunate consequence—the subordination of Blacks—that
might possibly result from that process.
The four Justices who dissented in that case seemed to be of an entirely
different mind. Reflecting their understanding of the overarching purpose
of the Equal Protection Clause, they, unlike Kennedy, even doubted the
appropriateness of judging the Seattle/Louisville transfer program under
strict scrutiny. Nevertheless, I would venture to say that Justice Kennedy
embraced their understanding of the overarching purpose of the Equal
Protection Clause. He parted company with them, however, when he
insisted upon what might be called the blanket version of strict scrutiny.
Under this version, strict scrutiny is triggered whenever the state uses a racial
classification, even if that measure would improve the position of Blacks in
American society. Yet this difference was not based on a denial of the central
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause—to guard against the institution
and maintenance of caste. Rather, it was based on a contestable, pragmatic
judgement—that the use of racial classifications, even when they improve the
status of the underclass, will be divisive, cause racial strife, and put off the
day when race would no longer matter.
Kennedy more nearly approached the position of the dissenters in Parents
Involved when he repudiated colorblindness as a legal requirement and
acknowledged that from the victims’ perspective, the harm attributable to de
facto and de jure segregation is pretty much the same. He approved of the
modification of attendance zones and the construction of new schools as ways
to eradicate segregated patterns of student attendance. He deemed
integration a compelling public purpose for the purpose of applying the strict
scrutiny test. He also paid tribute to Brown v. Board of Education when he spoke
movingly of the nation’s commitment to become an integrated society that
provided equal educational opportunities to all its children.
These features of Justice Kennedy’s Parents Involved concurrence reveal the
ground he shared with Breyer who dissented and in truth abound to
44
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Kennedy's credit. Kennedy stumbled, however, when he turned his oftenexpressed distaste for racial classifications into an offense to human dignity;
he compounded that error by presenting this objection to the
Seattle/Louisville transfer program as a transgression of the narrow tailoring
requirement; and he then, most unfortunately, used this breach of the narrow
tailoring requirement to strike down the modest efforts of Seattle and
Louisville to desegregate their schools. Kennedy turned dignity into a limit
on equality and most perversely did so in the name of the Equal Protection
Clause, which, in truth, was adopted to safeguard the freedom and dignity of
the newly freed slaves.
THE FUTURE OF NARROW TAILORING
For a half century now, the Supreme Court has been moving backwards
on civil rights. In the mid-1970s, when it handed down Milliken v. Bradley and
placed decisive limits on Brown v. Board of Education, the Court renounced its
leadership of the Second Reconstruction and the process of dismantling
American society’s caste structure. Then, when a good number of political
and civil institutions attempted to fill this void, seeking to advance the aims
of the Second Reconstruction on their own, a newly reconstituted Court—
first led by Warren Burger, then by William Rehnquist, and now John
Roberts—began policing their civil rights policies. On some occasions—
most notably, the 2007 Parents Involved decision—the Court went so far as to
obstruct voluntary school integration. Even Justice Stevens, so uniquely
positioned to understand the Court’s volte face, ended his Parents Involved
dissent on a haunting note: “It is my firm conviction that no Member of the
Court I joined in 1975 would have agreed with today’s decision.”45
In charting this new, arguably reactionary course, the majority that
prevailed encountered strong and passionate protests from their colleagues.
Both Milliken v. Bradley and Parents Involved were 5 to 4 decisions. In both cases,
moreover, one of the five-person majority wrote a separate opinion to explain
his vote; in Milliken it was Potter Stewart and in Parents Involved it was Anthony
Kennedy. Apparently, they had listened to the dissenters and had felt, much
like an undertow, the pull of their words. Even more remarkably, both
Justices relied on the narrow tailoring requirement, thereby giving great
prominence to a previously obscure branch of the law. While Stewart found
the narrow tailoring requirement in equity jurisprudence, Kennedy saw it as
a component of strict scrutiny.
45
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This reliance on the narrow tailoring requirement endowed Stewart’s
and Kennedy’s positions on school desegregation with a measured,
temperate quality. It seemed as though their votes were compelled by a
purely technical concern—the fit between means and ends was not as close
as it could have been. Upon closer examination, however, we see that this
impression was an illusion. In each case, these Justices used the law of narrow
tailoring to mask deeper, broader, and more contentious grounds of decision.
What divided Stewart from those who dissented in Milliken (Marshall,
Brennan, Douglas, and White) was not a technical issue concerning the scope
of equitable remedies. Rather, it was a disagreement about the meaning of
equal protection when the segregated pattern of student attendance spanned
contiguous school districts, a disagreement about Michigan’s responsibility
to redraw school district boundaries so as to end that segregation, and even
a disagreement about the role of the federal judiciary in American society.
Stewart made a pass at some of these issues, but only in a few sentences of a
footnote that he addressed, touchingly, to Thurgood Marshall.
Similarly, what divided Kennedy from those who dissented in Parents
Involved (Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens) was not a disagreement
about whether the Seattle/Louisville transfer plan adequately fit the end it
was supposed to serve—integration. Obviously, it did. Rather, the division
arose from a disagreement about whether the use of racial classifications in a
program designed to integrate public schools offends human dignity and if
so, whether the Constitution should be construed to prevent such an alleged
offense when doing so would preclude state agencies from instituting a
program that itself responds to concerns of human dignity and furthers the
overarching purpose of the Equal Protection Clause—to guard against the
maintenance and perpetuation of a caste system.
The narrow tailoring requirement cannot resolve issues so profound and
far-reaching as these. The version of the narrow tailoring requirement that
arises from equity jurisprudence and the rules regarding the scope of
injunctions can safely be abandoned altogether; its practical effect is canceled
by another requirement of equity that mandates broad and effective
remedies. Every judge understands the importance of defining the violation
of law with clarity and precision, for an injunction is nothing more than a
legal instrument for preventing a violation of law from occurring or
recurring, or to eradicate the effects of a violation of law that had already
occurred. When the violation or its effect is broad, the injunction must be
broad. When the violation is attributable to institutional failures, the internal
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structure of the institution will have to be reformed in order to protect the
violation from recurring.
The situation with the narrow tailoring requirement, drawn from strict
scrutiny, is more complicated. Narrow tailoring makes sense as a component
of strict scrutiny when state action appears to threaten equal protection
values, as it did in the police-dragnet hypothetical, in order to achieve some
compelling public purpose such as public safety—important but not directly
linked to the central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause. Instead, the
contested action in such a case will be defended on the ground that it is an
excusable violation of that provision of the Constitution. In that instance,
the narrow tailoring requirement, seen as an exercise of instrumental
rationality, would economize on the sacrifice of equal protection values. As
such, it reflects the understandable desire, as frequently expressed in freespeech cases, where strict scrutiny also applies, to hold out for the least
restrictive alternative.
Conceivably, strict scrutiny may also be used when state action appears,
as was the case in Parents Involved, to further, rather than offend, the values
protected by the Equal Protection Clause. In this context, the narrow
tailoring requirement provides a second hurdle—the first is the compelling
public purpose component, which, almost by hypothesis, is satisfied.
Admittedly, good intentions are often not good enough, so it might seem
appropriate for the Court to ascertain that the means chosen by the state are
reasonably calculated to achieve this purpose. Such a rule would be a more
relaxed version of the instrumental component of strict scrutiny than the
narrow tailoring requirement. However, even if this option is not pursued
and the more traditional narrow tailoring component of strict scrutiny is
retained in such cases, as seems likely to occur in the near future, that
requirement should be emphatically confined to an instrumental assessment
of the means the state chose to pursue particular ends. Under no
circumstances should it become a vehicle for moral speculations about
human dignity, especially when such speculations interfere with the
progressive realization of the overarching purpose of the Equal Protection
Clause.
Even once the law of narrow tailoring is shorn of its excesses, the issues
that divided the center and more liberal wings of the Court—and that in
truth account for Justice Stewart’s and Justice Kennedy’s concurrences—will
remain. These issues are supremely difficult and do not lend themselves to
any easy answers. The hope is, however, that if the Justices who occupy such
positions can put aside their debates about narrow tailoring and openly
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discuss that which truly divided them, the agreement that at first seemed
unattainable might be achieved.
In addition, recognizing the limited domain of the law of narrow tailoring
might well also enhance the integrity of the Court’s deliberations as a whole
and eventually improve the quality of its opinions. The mask narrow
tailoring might otherwise provide for minimizing the threat to equal
protection values (as occurred in Milliken) or for undisciplined moralizing (as
occurred in Parents Involved) would be removed. In this way, the stated reason
for a decision might more closely approximate the actual reason for it. Such
a change would facilitate critical analysis of the Court’s work and thus
strengthen the system—maybe the only system—through which we may
hold Justices accountable.

